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PROTECTION OF A TRADE NAME IN NEW
YORK STATE

T HE proudest boast of protagonists of the case-made law
which forms the basis of our jurisprudence is its flexibility. No other system, they say, can so readily adapt itself
to new and unforeseen conditions, so easily maintain the desirable relationship between legality and the ever shifting
standards of morality. And of all courts administering casemade law, the courts of equity, with their respect for legal
maxims and legal consciences, boast themselves the most
adaptable. In an important and rapidly developing branch
of the law in this country, many courts of equity, and perhaps particularly the courts of New York State, have for the
past fifteen years been weaving decisions into a straitjacket
which may prove hard for them completely to break and
which would legalize piracy upon an enormous scale if they
should not succeed in breaking it.
The subject is that generally and most unhappily known
as "unfair competition." The straitjacket is the classical and
verbally immaculate doctrine that there can be no unfair
competition unless there is competition. The piracy is the
use, by unscrupulous or careless business men, of the trade
names or trade marks of others who are not, to be sure, in
strict competition with them but whose names or marks are
so well known that serious injury, of several kinds, may
result from the imitation.
A large number of recent cases, primarily in the Federal
Courts, but also in the Courts of this State, show that the
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judges are awakening to the unjust results of the classical
doctrine we have mentioned. Legal thought is so largely a
matter of legal phrasing that the law is frequently warped
by too nice a respect for the precise wording of rules which
were adequate when they took shape but which have become
inadequate to unforeseen developments. When the unfortunate results begin to appear, the courts usually overrule
the harmful doctrine or distinguish it out of existence, and
there is abundant evidence that they are about to do so here.
Such a process, however, is generally a rather slow one; it
might conceivably not act quickly enough to meet the needs
of a rushing modern industrialism. The process in this case,
however, seems to be already well under way in the lower
Federal and New York Courts. Whether the Supreme Court
of the United States and the Court of Appeals will agree is
still problematical. We may venture a prediction, however,
based upon what we conceive to be the signs of the time, that
they will.
The subject of trade marks, strictly speaking, is outside
of the subject of this article, but it is so closely related' to
it that an initial reference becomes necessary. The law seems
clearly established by controlling decisions and innumerable
dicta that the use of another's trade mark on goods which do
not compete is legal.2 The legion of decisions deal principally with the question whether particular goods are sufficiently similar to other particular goods so that they do com'Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 194 N. Y. 429, 87 N. E. 674 (1909). In this case
the Court of Appeals, by Werner, I., said at page 434: "A trade mark may be
tersely defined to be any sign, mark, symbol, word or words, which indicate
the origin or ownership of an article as distinguished from its quality, and
which others have not the equal right to employ for the same purpose. In its
strictest sense, it is applicable only to a vendible article of merchandise to which
it is affixed. A trade name relates to a business and its good will rather
than a vendible commodity. * * * There are doubtless many instances in which
the same signs, marks, symbols, etc., may serve both as trade marks and trade
names. * * * Although we agree with the learned Appellate Division in
recognizing the techiical distinction between trade marks and trade names, we
think the same fundamental principles of law and equity are applicable to
both." This case is cited upon this point, with approval, in American Steel
Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372 (1926) at p. 380.
'See for a few of the innumerable examples: American Steel Foundries
v. Robertson, supra, at p. 381; United Drug Company v. Theodore Rectanus
Company, 248 U. S. 90, 98 (1918) ; Hanover Star Milling Company v. Metcalf,
240 U. S. 403 (1915); Borden's Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk
Co., 201 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912); Wallach Brothers v. Wallach, 200 App.
Div. 169, 192 N. Y. S. 723 (1st Dept., 1922).

PROTECTION OF A TRADE NAME

pete-and the net result is confusing, to say the least.3 The
significance of a trade mark, furthermore, is limited, for
reasons running back into the origin of such marks in guildcontrolled industry of the Middle Ages, to pointing out either
the source of the goods marked or their ownership by the
distributor. If the use of a trade-mark does not tend to mis4
lead in either respect, it is legal.
Mr. Frank I. Schechter, in a masterly article,G has recently pointed out the inadequacy of these doctrines to protect trade marks in modern business. The trade mark is
much more than an indication of the source or ownership of
the goods marked. The buying public does not in fact know
or care what corporation or firm produces or distributes the
goods it buys. The psychology of buyers is infinitely less
specific. A distinctive mark or name upon goods which a
person has bought and has found satisfactory becomes associated in his mind most frequently with a rather vague sense
of satisfaction. Whenever a similar distinctive mark is seen
or a similar distinctive name is heard, the mental association
more or less consciously operates. A predisposition in favor
of the goods advertised by the new mark or name more or
less consciously arises.6
'Frank I. Schechter in "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,"
40 Har. L. Rev. 813 (1927), gives the following examples, at p. 823: Bread
and flour (Ward Baking Co. v. Potter-Wrightington, 298 Fed. 398, C. C. A.
1st, 1924) ; pancake flour and syrup (Aunt Jemima Mills v. Rigney & Co., 247
Fed. 409, C. C. A. 2d, 1917), are in-the same class, while, on the other hand,
"straight" wheat flour and "prepared flours"--such as "pancake flour" (France
Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F. (2d) 304, 305, C. C. A. 2d, 1925,
certiorari denied 268 U. S. 705, 1925)-are declared not to be of the same
"class of commodities." Chewing gum, held to be a "food," and chewing
tobacco, held to be a "narcotic" (Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7
F. (2d) 967, C. C. A. 3d, 1925; ice cream and milk (Borden Ice Cream Co. v.
Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510, C. C. A. 7th, 1912), are held of
the same class; while cheese and butter (Lawrence v. Sharpless Co., 203 Fed.
762, 764, E. D. Pa., 1913, affirmed on cross-appeals, 208 Fed. 886, C. C. A. 3d,
1913), are found to be of different classes. Since Mr. Schechter wrote, the
Beech-Nut case has been affirmed on certiorari, but on slightly different
grounds, 273 U. S.629 (1927). See also Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 7
F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) holding that the same Court's decisions in
trade name cases were not authorities for trade mark cases.
'Cf. A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 Fed. 539 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921),
reversed 260 U. S.689 (1923) ; Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U. S.359 (1924).
r See note 3, supra.
'The following language from Powell v. The Birmingham Vinegar
Brewery Company, Ltd., 13 R. P. C. 235, 250 (1896) is quoted in the very
recent case of Standard Oil Co. v. California Peach & Fig Growers, Inc., 28 F.
(2d) 283 (Dist. Ct. D., Dela., October 1, 1928) : "A person whose name is not
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All of this is largely true, also, of trade names. The
purchase of goods is merely the outstanding example of an
infinite number of rather casual business dealings, in which
there is no close personal contact and in which one person
has little if any existence in the mind of the other-except as
a name. This grows more and more true as business becomes
organized in larger and larger units and as the range of
operations of a single company extends itself over states and
nations. The public in great numbers sell to such companies, as well as buy from them, have other transactions
with them too various to enumerate. And wherever these
transactions are satisfactory the name of the company comes
to have a certain conscious or unconscious business-getting
power.
When a business man selects a name other than his own
under which to do business he is taking an affirmative action
which may be extremely damaging to prior users of a similar
name. It seems not unreasonable, therefore, to hold him to
a high standard of care in selecting such a name. If his
business is incorporated, there are certain statutory prohibitions upon conflicting names which he must consider. The
observance of these, however, is not alone enough. 'Some
prior user of the proposed name may not be a corporation,
and so may not receive the protection of such statutory
provision. Or our business man may incorporate in a distant
state and carry on nothing but inter-state business in a state
where a prior user of the name is operating, so that qualification to do business there is not required and the statutory
provision has no chance to operate. In such cases, although
the statutes governing corporate names do not apply, courts
of equity will none the less enjoin the unjustifiable use of a
competitor's name or of one sufficiently similar to it to mislead. And even in cases where the corporation laws should
prevent conflict a compliance with them is not a defense to a
suit for infringement."
known, but whose mark is imitated, is just as much injured in his trade as if
his name was known as well as his mark. His mark, as used by him, has
given a reputation to his goods. His trade depends greatly on such reputation.
His mark sells his goods."
"See Lerner Stores Corporation v. Lerner Ladies' Apparel Shops, Inc., 218
App. Div. 427, 218 N. Y. S. 442 (lst Dept. 1926); Henry Manufacturing Co.,
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What will constitute the unjustifiable infringement of a
competitor's trade name is an intricate question and one
which depends on many factors. A purely arbitrary or fanciful name is undoubtedly the sort which the courts will be
quickest to protect. And, similarly, if a name is not wholly
aribtrary but its application to a particular type of business
is so, the courts will hold any imitation unjustifiable. For
example, the word "congress" is not wholly arbitrary or
fanciful and yet its use in connection with spring water is so,
and a company using "Congress Spring" in the customary
sale of such water will be protected against any other person
who attempts to adopt the same phrase in connection with
a similar business. 8 In such cases there is no conceivable
justification for the manifest imitation. It is the result
either of evil intent, or of unconscious plagiarism, or at the
very least of coincidence. No one of these merits court protection against a prior user. Even a bona fide adoption, by
purest chance, of an arbitrary competing name probably does
not protect the second user unless his name was adopted at a
distance and he has already by its use built up a valuable
good will connected with its use.9
Of the circumstances which justify the use of a similar
name or phrase, so that the courts will hold there to be no
illegal imitation, the strongest, undoubtedly, is the fact that
the language imitated is purely descriptive of the business.
Since anyone may compete, anyone may use a phrase of this
sort. An excellent example of this is found in the use by one
company which repaired and dealt in second-hand typewriters of the words "Typewriter Exchange" as the last part
of its corporate name. It was held that it had no right to
enjoin a rival offshoot which set up a similar business on the
same street from using "Typewriter Exchange" as a part of
its corporate name.1" Another ground of justification, probably weaker, is the recognized right of an individual to engage in business under his own name, even though a rival
Inc. v. Henry Screen Manufacturing Co., 204 App. Div. 27, 197 N. Y. S. 444
(2d 'Dept.
1922).
The Congress
& Empire Spring Company v. High Rock Congress Spring
Company, 45 N. Y. 291 (1871). This was a trade mark case.
* See note 24, infra.
Buffalo Typewriter Exchange, Inc. v. McGarl, 240 N. Y. 113, 147 N. E.

546 (1925).
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individual or company is already in the same field in the
same place operating under the same or a similar name.1 1
It is to be noted, however, that what a person may do as an
individual he may not always do as a corporation. 1 2 Another ground of justification is that the imitated phrase is
merely a geographical designation which no person has a
right exclusively to appropriate.' 3 An important consideration here is whether the geographical term is fairly applicable to the business which the new user does or reasonably
proposes to do.' 4 The more applicable and less arbitrary it
is, of course, the stronger the justification. What might well
be treated, similarly, as a qualified justification, is the fact
that the two businesses do not compete and are unlikely ever
to compete. Here lack of competition seems to find its
proper niche, rather than as the sine qua non to which position it has so often and authoritatively been raised.' 5
In none of these cases is the justification absolute or
unqualified. If the name imitated is merely a means used to
deceive the public and to steal a part of its business from the
prior user, an injunction will issue.' 6 And if the prior user
' Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N. Y. 427 (1875).
' Charles S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462, 39 N. E.
490 (1895).
"Fred Butterfield & Co., Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 241 N. Y. 560,
150 N. E. 555 (1925). This was a trade mark case.
"' Cf. Coming Glass Works v. Corning Cut Glass Company, 197 N. Y. 173,
90 N. E. 449 (1910).
'This
was suggested, in substance, by Circuit Judge Denison when he
wrote in Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th,
1924), for the court, at page 512: "We come, then, to what is called 'unfair
competition.' This is nothing but a convenient name for the doctrine that no
one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of another. This rule is
usually invoked when there is an actual market competition between the
analogous products of the plaintiffs and the defendants, and so it has been
natural enough to speak of it as the doctrine of unfair competition; but there
is no fetish in the word 'competition.' The invocation of equity rests more
vitally upon the unfairness" (italics ours). The District Court had held that
since there was no competition, the "Vogue" magazine had no right to enjoin the
"Vogue" hat stores from using a capital V label, with a girl in it, imitative of
the label long used by the magazine. This decision Judge Denison reversed
because so many people would think the magazine sponsored the hats. An
admirable decision. For the subsequent history of the litigation, raising certain
other questions, see 6 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) ; 12 F. (2d) 991
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; petition for certioraridenied, 273 U. S. 706 (1926).
18 British-American Tobacco Co. v. British-American Cigar Store Co., 211
Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; Westphal v. Westphal's World's Best Corporation, 216 App. Div. 53, 215 N. Y. S. 4 (1st Dept. 1926), with authorities discussed,. affirmed without opinion, 243 N. Y. 639, 154 N. E. 638 (1926); P. J.
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has been so long and so extensively in business that his trade

name has acquired a significance for a large part of the public
to which both competitors will appeal, an injunction will

ordinarily issue against an imitator even though the imitation consists merely in words which are descriptive of the
nature or organization of the business,17 or in an individual's
proper name 18 or in a geographical designation.1 9 The usual
language in which such decisions are clothed is to say that

the imitated phrase has acquired a "secondary meaning" as
a part of the prior user's name.20 What this means, obviously, is simply that the elements of justification are not
strong enough to overcome the prior user's right as it has
become fixed by long use and general knowledge. Thus, to
venture an hypothetical case in a dangerous field, we may
assume that a new "United States Steel Company" would
have difficulty in resisting an injunction prayed by the
Tierney Sons, Inc. v. Tierney Bros., Inc., 130 Misc. 428 (Sp. T. N. Y. Co.,

1927).
' Standard Varnish Works v. Fisher, Thorsen & Co., 153 Fed. 928 (Circ.

Ct., D. Oreg., 1907). Judge Wolverton said at page 930: "The preparation in
question is very naturally called 'Turpentine Shellac,' as it consists principally
of a mixing or combination of the two more simple ingredients, turpentine and
shellac, and, of course, in its ordinary signification the name is merely descriptive of the compound. It can scarcely indicate origin or proprietorship, so that
it is not a term or designation suitable for appropriation as a trade mark in
the technical sense. As a trade name, it may be properly so employed, but
within itself it is inapt for exclusive appropriation as a trade mark. Beyond
this, however, words or symbols naturally descriptive of the product, while not
adapted for exclusive use as a trade mark, may yet acquire, by long and general
usage in connection with the preparation and by association with the name of the
manufacturer, a secondary meaning or signification, such as will express or
betoken the goods of that manufacturer only, and in this sense he will be
entitled to protection from an unfair use of the designation or trade name by
others that may result in his injury and in fraud of the public."
" World's Dispensary Medical Association v. Robert J. Pierce, 203 N. Y.
419, 96 N. E. 738 (1911); see, contra, Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's
Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) in which District Judge
Carpenter, writing for the Court, said, at page 514: "Doubtless it is morally
wrong for a person to proclaim, or even intimate, that his goods are manufactured by some other and well-known concern; but this does not give rise to a
private right of action, unless the property rights of that concern are interfered
with. The use by the new company of the name 'Borden' may have been with
fraudulent intent; and, even assuming that it was, the trial court had no right
to interfere, unless the property rights of the old company were jeopardized
* * *" as they were not because commercial ice cream, which the plaintiff
had never manufactured, did not compete with milk l
" British-American Tobacco Co. v. British-American Cigar Stores Co., 211
Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
" See, for one of many examples, the extract from Judge Wolverton's
opinion in the Standard Varnish Works case, quoted in note 15, supra.
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"United States Steel Corporation" even though the names
are not identical; even though "United States" is merely a
geographical term describing the territory throughout which
the new company in good faith intends to operate; and even
though "Steel" is a mere description of the type of business
it intends in good faith to carry on.
We have mentioned some of the complex considerations
bearing upon the question whether there is or is not illegal
imitation rather for the purpose of clearing them out of
the way than with any thought of dealing with them exhaustively. Their very complexity in fact defies exhaustive, scientific treatment, and brings one, somewhat out of breath, to
that haven of legal refuge: "the facts of each case determine
its result." Since the motive of an imitator of a trade name
is, in equity, a most important consideration, and since his
motive is seldom capable of direct proof, it is natural to find
more or less standard situations being recognized where the
motive is presumed to be wrongful and the imitation unjustified, and other more or less standard situations where the
motive is presumed to be lawful and the imitation justified
unless the equities of the prior user are unusually persuasive.
It is also natural to find that there is no apparent rule without apparent exceptions. The real question in all of these
cases is whether on the facts there is an unjustifiable imitation,-something hurtful to a plaintiff which shocks the
sense of fairness of the court. From now on we shall assume
that such an unjustifiable imitation does exist and inquire
whether a prior user may nevertheless find himself denied
relief on the ground that the new user is not a competitor
and that there can be no unfair competition where there is
no competition.
The various decisions of the New York State courts in
dealing with this situation have made it clear that until very
recently they regarded actual competition as an essential element in an action to enjoin the use of a trade name. A recent
decision of the Court of Appeals raises some doubt on this
point, though without discussing it; and a very recent decision of the First Department of the Appellate Division
boldly and squarely holds that competition is not a sine qua
non. Let us examine a few of the New York cases.
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In Chas. S. Higgins Company v. Higgins Soap Co.,21 the
court dealt with a case in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the use by the defendant in New York State of its corporate
name, "Higgins Soap Company" on the ground that it was
so similar to the name of plaintiff as to lead to confusion. The
court allowed an injunction, distinguishing the older case of
Meneely v. Meneely, 22 which had stressed the right of a man
to do business under his own name, on the ground that this
right did not extend to the use of one's own name in an incorporated business.
The Court used the following language, which has become
a classical statement of the circumstances under which a
cause of action to restrain infringement of a plaintiff's trade
name is maintainable:
"Whether the court will interfere in a particular
case must depend upon the circumstances; the identity
or similarity of the names; the identity of the business of the respective corporations; how far the name
is a true description of the kind and quality of the
articles manufactured or the business carried on; the
extent of the confusion which may be created or apprehended, and other circumstances which might justly
influence the judgment of the judge in granting or
withholding the remedy."
This language is unexceptionable upon its face, for it
purports to do no more than suggest certain factors which a
court should consider in deciding for or against relief. Competition vel non is certainly such a factor. But the case has
come to stand for a narrower doctrine. It will be noted that
the court lists, second only to the similarity of names, the
identity of the business of the respective corporations. They
must be engaged not only in similar businesses, but in the
same business.
This idea bears fruit in Corning Glass Works v. Corning
CUt Glass Company. 23 The City of Corning had long been
associated in the minds of the public with the glass industry.
144 N. Y. 462, 39 N. E. 490 (1895).
-62 N. Y.427 (1875).
197 N. Y. 173, 90 N. E. 449 (1910).
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Many concerns were engaged there in that business. The
plaintiff Corning Glass Works had been incorporated for
the purpose of manufacturing glass and glassware in the
year 1875, and had operated in the City of Corning ever since.
It manufactured a number of glass articles and also so-called
"blanks" which it furnished to glass cutters as the raw material for cut glass and glass engraving. This last product,
namely, "blanks," constituted about ten percent of the product of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had never at any time itself
engaged in the actual cutting of glass. The defendant was
incorporated a number of years after the plaintiff, and thereupon located its works in the Town of Corning at a short distance from the City. The evidence did not show that there
was any direct competition between the plaintiff and the
defendant or that the plaintiff had actually suffered in its
business. The court, by Judge Gray, held that no case of
unfair competition was made out, saying at page 177:
"In result, the plaintiff's claim is reduced to this:
that it is entitled to preventive relief, merely, because
of a similarity in names, which is liable to create unfair trade, by reason of a possible confusion in the
minds of those transacting business with either corporation, to its probable injury. If that were borne
out by the facts, doubtless, the plaintiff would have a
standing in court to protect itself from injury, reasonably to be anticipated. If it be made to appear that
there is real ground for a present apprehension of a
future injury to a complainant's property, a court of
equity will entertain a suit to quiet that apprehension.
The defendant would have no right to establish itself
as a rival manufacturer and, by imitation of name, to
mislead the public into buying its manufactures,
under the impression that they were buying those of
the plaintiff. But that is not this case; for, not only,
is there lacking the element of identity in the business
carried on, but the defendant's name, clearly enough,
distinguished the kind of article it would offer to the
trade. The evidence shows that the manufacture of
cut glass is a distinct business; in which the plaintiff
has not been, and was not, engaged. Between the two
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concerns there has been no competition, nor rivalry;
because each produces a distinct class of ware." (Italics ours.)
Judge Gray then went on to discuss the difficulty that
the word "Corning" identified no particular business, but is
merely a geographical name. Upon this ground, it seems, the
case might very properly have been decided as it was. The
use of a geographical name which is already identified with
an industry rather than with any particular company would
seem to afford a high degree of justification to a newcomer
who in good faith establishes his business in the locality
whose name he seeks to adopt. But the case was not decided
upon this ground, but upon the ground that there must be
competition. This appears from the later discussion and the
following language which Judge Gray uses:
"The law of unfair competition rests on the principle that no person has the right to sell his own goods
as those of another by misleading the public."
For the mere infringement of a trade name to amount to
unfair competition, business must be stolen. This is the
classical doctrine, and seems to be the position squarely taken
by the Court of Appeals in the Corning case. It makes no
allowance for the good will resulting from the favorable
knowledge by the public of the name of an established company. To revert for the moment to our hypothetical case,
the "United States Steel Company" could under the doctrine
enunciated by the Corning case, legally enter into the business of manufacturing some steel product which the United
States Steel Corporation does not produce. Such a case
might conceivably be distinguished on the rather narrow
ground that the "United States Steel Company's" name does
not indicate its special business, but such a distinction would
be a departure from the rationale of the Corning decision.
Some of the Federal decisions indicate a healthy willingness
to enjoin infringement of trade name in a field into which the
plaintiff might reasonably desire to expand,2 4 but the New
2" See, for a very interesting example, the recent case of Sweet Sixteen Co. v.
Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) dealing with the
vexed problem of territorial limitations upon trade marks and trade names.
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York courts have not given any indication of adopting this
view. The newcomer's path to the acquisition of business
would be smoothed by the fact that many persons would
surely believe they were dealing with the well-known and
thoroughly reliatile United States Steel Corporation. If the
newcomer's products were not of high quality, the purchasers
would feel themselves aggrieved by the United States Steel
Corporation and would hesitate to do business with it in
other lines, and yet there would be no redress in a court of
equity because, forsooth, there is no competition.
The doctrine that actual competition is essential to enjoin the use of a conflicting trade name finds expression again
in The Eastern 'Construction Co., Inc. v. Eastern Engineering Corporation. 25 In this case the plaintiff and the defendant were both engaged in the same sort of business, bidding
for and carrying out contracts for the construction of public
works. The plaintiff was incorporated in 1922, but had carried on a similar business under the trade name of Eastern
Construction Company for many years prior to that time.
The defendant was incorporated in 1926. The plaintiff at
once objected to its use of the word "Eastern" and brought
this action for an injunction upon the defendant's refusal to
change its name.
Judge Lehman, writing for the Court, found that the
plaintiff and the defendant were competitors in the sense
that they often bid for the same contracts, and stated that a
court of equity might restrain them as such competitors from
using methods of competition which are unfair. "Neither
may by misrepresentation or deceit obtain, from the public,
business which the other might have received" (p. 462). After
mentioning the procedure by which the case had come before
the Court of Appeals, he then continued, at pages 462-465:
"Justification, if any, for the injunction must rest
upon a finding that the corporate name which the defendant has adopted, with the sanction of the State, is
so similar to the name under which the plaintiff conThe Rectamis and Hanover cases, cited in note 2, -supra, are the leading cases
upon the subject, but left for future decision important questions of inala fide
appropriation with which the Sweet Sixteen case deals in a wholesome spirit.
246 N. Y. 459 (November, 1927).
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ducts its business that the public may be confused and
that some persons may do business with the defendant
in the belief that they are dealing with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's moving affidavits sufficiently show that
the plaintiff has built up a business reputation and
good will. The name under which a business is carried on is inextricably entwined with its reputation
and good will. It is said that in this case the name
'Eastern' is a geographical term, descriptive of the
territory in which both corporations conduct their
business, and that the plaintiff may not appropriate
such a term as its exclusive property. Technical distinction between geographical or descriptive trade
names on the one hand and fanciful trade names on
the other hand is unimportant in this case. The defendant may not expressly or impliedly represent that
it is the same corporation or connected with the same
corporation which has built up a reputation and good
will under the name of Eastern Construction Company. If, in the business of building construction, the
name 'Eastern' has become so exclusively associated
with the plaintiff that its use by the defendant in its
corporate name tends naturally to induce the belief in
those dealing with the defendant that they are dealing
with the plaintiff, then, to that extent, the use by the
defendant of the corporate name chosen by it constitutes a misrepresentation, fraudulent if chosen with
intent to deceive, innocent, at least in its inception, if
chosen without such intent. Misrepresentation though
innocent at its inception may become wrongful if unreasonably persisted in, after knowledge of its tendency to deceive has been gained. The courts have
never found difficulty in protecting the public and the
owner of the good will of a business against the deceptive use of a trade name even though that name was
originally chosen without wrongful purpose. (Ewing
v. Buttercup Margerine Company, Ltd., [1917] 2 Ch.
Div. 1.) Common right to use geographical or descriptive terms; even individual right to use one's
own name, does not include a use which is calculated
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to deceive. (Corning Glass Works v. Corning Cut
Glass Co.. 197 N. Y. 173; Ball v. Broadway Bazaar,
194 N. Y. 429; Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144
N. Y. 462.) 'The name of a person or a town may have
become so associated with a particular product that
the mere attaching of that name to a similar product
without more would have all the effect of a falsehood.'
(HerringHall Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208
U. S. 554.) Judicial interference will depend upon
the facts proved and found in each case. The test is
whether resemblance is calculated to produce confusion as to identity and consequent damage. (American Steel Foundriesv. Bobertson, 269 U. S. 372.)
Tried by that test, the evidence in this case is insufficient to justify the injunction which has been
granted. Some similarity of name exists, but joined
with difference so marked that it can hardly be overlooked, especially by those concerned in matters of
such importance as the award of a contract for the
construction of a public building. True, not all persons constantly exercise caution in their daily affairs,
and a merchant may be injured by deception of the
incautious and unwary among his customers. The nature of the business in which the defendant competes
with the plaintiff reduces almost to the vanishing
point the possibility of deception and damage in this
case. The defendant does not seek the patronage of
the wayfarer whose purchases are often dictated by
hasty impression rather than inspection and consideration. The defendant competes with the plaintiff in
bidding for public work. When it chose the word
'Eastern' as part of its name, it could hardly have
expected that its name might result in the acceptance
of bids for public work which otherwise would have
been rejected. No bid of the defendant has been accepted and no contract has been awarded to it, because
an architect or other person examining bids or awarding contracts has been confused as to the defendant's
identity. As to such persons no reasonable inference
can be drawn that the name tends to deceive and con-
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stitutes a misrepresentation. The affidavits show that
there has been some confusion in the minds of others
dealing with the plaintiff in more casual manner.
Choice of name by the defendant could not be dictated
by intent through such confusion to obtain a benefit
at the plaintiff's expense. Such confusion resulting
merely in non-delivery of mail or other messages would
indeed tend to the detriment of the defendant, though
perhaps in lesser degree than to the plaintiff. Moreover, it appears that other building and contracting
companies using the word 'Eastern' as part of their
names are listed in the telephone directory. The value
of the plaintiff's reputation and good will is not shown
to be materially decreased by possible confusion. Certainly the defendant is not shown to be in a position to
gain any advantage by it. Reasonable probability of
loss of business by the plaintiff which constitutes the
ground for the intervention of a court of equity is
wanting."
It thus appears that a plaintiff and a defendant must not
only be competitors in the sense that both strive to secure the
same business, but the nature of their competition must be
such that the similarity of name is likely to cause confusion
and to bestow upon one of the competitors business which
was intended for the other. If there is no reasonable danger
of this there can be no infringement of trade name. This is
the old idea that passing off one person's goods for those of
another is the gravamen of unfair competition. No heed is
paid to the intangible injury which may result from confusion.
Here again, as in the Corning case, the decision might
have gone on a different ground. The other building and contracting companies doing business under the geographical
name "Eastern" might have been a reason for holding that
the adoption of this name by a company operating in the
eastern part of the United States was a right of which no
prior user could deprive a newcomer in the field. But that is
not the ground upon which the case went, and it is expressly
stated by Judge Lehman, in the quotation above, that he
would not alter his opinion if instead of "Eastern" the in-
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fringing word had been some wholly fanciful and arbitrary
name unrelated to geography or to the nature of the business.
In a terse and vigorous dissent, Judge Crane expresses
a view which to us seems a sounder judicial standard for
business morals and vastly more consonant with the actual
facts of business competition in New York State to-day. It
reads (p. 466) :
"With all the other names which the defendant
could have taken, why did it choose 'Eastern'? There
is no answer except that it expected to and did reap
the advantages gained by the long user of the name
by the plaintiff. The defendant entered the field of
similar business to compete with the plaintiff. It took
the word 'Eastern' long used by the plaintiff. It was
timely warned of the damage being done by the subtle
deception and still persisted in its course. In all fairness why did it not take another name; Western,
Northern, Southern, Blue, any name among the millions which could have been selected. No, it must
stick to Eastern, to be used in New York City where
the plaintiff was bidding for its construction and engineering work. The points of the compass had nothing
to do with the nature of the business conducted by
these parties. Eastern is no less arbitrary than Arctic
or Solar. The defendant should fall in line and do
the fair thing. Business in these modern days is complicated enough without having some new-born competitor mix up identities.
Early decisions are of little use as authorities on
modern New York City competition. They could no
more imagine these conditions than they could foresee
the airship or the wireless. Let the defendant get a
new name and do its business on its own merits."
It is to be noted that Judge Crane does not differ on any
question of law from the majority of the court. He finds in
the record sufficient evidence of mala fides, of actual competition and of the probability of loss of business, to hold that an
injunction should have issued upon those grounds. It seems
probable, however, from language in an earlier and leading
case, that Judge Crane himself would take the additional step
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of saying that actual competition is not an essential element
in this type of action. In White Studio, Inc. v. Dreyfoos,28
Judge Crane, writing the opinion of the Court, used the following language:
"'The doctrine of unfair trade amounts to no
more than this: One person has no right to sell goods
as the goods of another, nor to do other business as the
business of another, and on proper showing will be restrained from so doing.' (Dyment v. Lewis, 144 Iowa,
509, 513; 38 Cyc. 756; Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 194
N. Y. 429,435; Munro v. Tousey, 129 N. Y. 38; Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. Improved B. & P.
Order of Elks, 205 N. Y. 459; Weinstock v. Marks, 109
Cal. 529; Gulden v. Chance, 182 Fed. Rep. 303.)
Unfair competition may result from representations or conduct which deceive the public into believing that the business name, reputation or good will of
one person is that of another. (Glen & Hall Mfg. Co.
v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226; Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf.
725; Lee v. Haley, L. R. [5 Ch.App.] 155; Holbrook v.
N-esbitt, 163 Mass. 120, 125; American Tobacco Co. v.
Polacsek, 170 Fed. Rep. 117.)" (Italics by the Court.)
These statements, it will be seen, are much broader in
their scope than the classical statement to which we have
previously referred. They were hardly necessary for the decision in the White Studio case, and there could hardly be any
doubt, after the Great Eastern case, that they represent a
doctrine broader than that actually followed by the Court
of Appeals, if it were not for the existence of a very recent
and somewhat puzzling decision.
27
In The Tecla Corporation et al. v. Salon Tecla, Ltd.,
the Court of Appeals had before it an appeal from the Appellate Division, First Department. 28 The case had arisen out
of an attempt by the makers of "Tecla" pearls to restrain
unfair competition by the defendant Salon Tecla, Ltd., in the
use of the registered trade mark and trade name "Tecla"
=221 N. Y. 46, 116 N. E. 796 (1917).
=249 N. Y. 157 (July, 1928).
'223 App. Div. 17 (March, 1928).
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owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant engaged in the business of selling cosmetics and of running a beauty parlor. It
sold no artificial pearls or any other jewelry of any sort dealt
in by the plaintiffs. Mr. Justice McAvoy, writing for an
unanimous Appellate Division, said at page 18:
"It is asserted by defendant that the sign-maker
of defendant, who had been told to use his own discretion with respect to the form of the sign, employed a
type of script somewhat resembling that of plaintiffs.
There is no evidence, however, of any unfair competition by defendant with any of plaintiffs' business activities. The evidence shows that prior to the commencement of the suit defendant voluntarily disavowed any intention of unfairly competing with
plaintiffs and expressed its willingness to so alter the
sign that there could be no possibility of confusion.
There was no proof of any sales or of the name of
a salesman or employee who had charge of, or anything
to do with, plaintiffs' alleged cosmetic business.
We think that on this showing the judgment was
unsupported by any evidence of the nature required
for an injunction to restrain so-called competition."
The Court of Appeals wrote a short and unanimous per
curiam decision to the effect that the use by the defendant
of the peculiar and characteristic script which the plaintiffs
had long employed for the display of their name is calculated
to emphasize unduly the similarity of names and forcibly to
suggest to the public identity of origin or management. The
court held accordingly that the judgment of the Appellate
Division should be modified so as to enjoin the defendant
from in any way using the peculiar and characteristic script
used by the plaintiffs. This decision may or may not indicate
a change in the attitude of the Court of Appeals. It seems
probable that there are types of unfair competition which a
court of equity would enjoin even though a plaintiff and a
defendant do not compete, methods of business injury which
would seem to any court so "raw" that it would brush aside
any contention that competition is an essential element. It
may be that this decision merely holds that the imitation of
the plaintiffs' script was such a method. On the other hand,
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the imitation of the script is only one method of imitating the
plaintiffs' trade name. The similarity is that perceived by
the eye instead of by the ear. It seems therefore that the
case must be classified as a trade name case; and upon the
record it seems abundantly clear that there was in it no actual
competition in the strict sense in which that has usually been
required for such cases.
Possibly encouraged by this reversal of its decision in
the Teela case, the First Department of the Appellate Division has taken the step of saying that competition, in the
strict sense, is not a sine qua non in a trade name case. Mr.
Justice Proskauer writing for an unanimous -Court in Long's
Hat Stores Corporation v. Long's Clothes, Inc. 29 held that
the plaintiff, which had been selling hats and haberdashery,
and at times clothing, in "Long's" stores since 1905, could
enjoin defendant, incorporated by one Louis Goldberg, from
selling retail clothing in a shop maintained under the name
'Long's Clothes, Inc." Plaintiff had at one time sold retail
clothing from its stores, but had temporarily discontinued
doing so, although expressing an intention to resume that
branch of its business. There was no individual by the name
of "Long" associated with Goldberg.
The Court below had denied a temporary injunction
which defendant resisted on the ground that there was no
actual competition. Mr. Justice Proskauer said: "Plaintiff,
however, is entitled to be protected not only from direct competition, but from any injury which might result to it from
the deception of the public through the unauthorized use of
its trade name or a trade name which would lead the public
to believe that it was in some way connected with plaintiff."
He then cited and quoted from the Vogue case. 30 Later he
used the following sentence: "In the enjoyment of its trade
name the plaintiff is to be protected not only with respect to
the merchandise it presently sells, but also with respect to
that which the public would believe, through the deception
practiced by the defendant that the plaintiff was selling."
He then proceeds, however, to rest the decision upon the
Reported in New York Law Journal, November 28, 1928. See also
leading editorial on the case and general subject in the same number.
' See note 15, supra.
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perfectly orthodox ground that the defendant's goods were
of the same class as those of the plaintiff, and so that they
did in fact compete. The importance of the case, therefore, is
less in its actual decision than in its language.
In conclusion we can merely say that the New York law
on the subject is in so rapid a state of flux that any present
estimate is dangerous. The trend toward greater liberality,
with its recognition of intangible rights, such as the right to
expand one's business, and of intangible injuries such as that
from unconscious mental confusion, appears, however, to be
very strong.
A New York lawyer whose client desires to enjoin the use
by another of a trade name similar to his own will do well, if
there is any question of actual competition in the case, to
consider whether the necessary facts required for Federal
jurisdiction and venue exist. The Federal Courts have shown
greater liberality in allowing injunctions under such circumstances than have any but the most recent of the New York
State Courts' decisions. The difference is perhaps one of emphasis more than one of language, but the tendency to greater
liberality is quite apparent. In British-American Tobacco
Co., Ltd. v. British-American Cigar Stores Co.,3 1 the Circuit
Court of Appeals allowed the complainant, British-American
Tobacco Co., Ltd., to enjoin a company from operating under
the name of "British-American Cigar Stores Co.," although
it appeared that there was no actual competition between
them inasmuch as the defendant sold tobacco at retail only
and the plaintiff sold tobacco only at wholesale. The Court
was influenced in its decision by the fact that the use of the
word "British" was in no respect descriptive of the defendant
company, its product, methods, place of incorporation or
place of doing business. The Court said at page 935:
"We are unable to discover any valid, or even a
plausible, reason for its adoption unless it was to
accomplish the objects alleged in the complaint. If
the object of the defendant were to sell its goods and
securities upon their merits5 what possible reason
could it have had in choosing a name which had been
'211 Fed. 933 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
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pre-empted in the tobacco trade for ten years? We
can think of none. If, on the other hand, the object
were to induce the unthinking public to believe that
the defendant was connected with the great BritishAmerican Company, with its boundless resources and
a decade of successful business behind it, the defendant's conduct was perfectly natural. * * * If there
were any valid reason for adopting the name, if the
business were other than tobacco, there might be some
reason for the defendant's action, but no honest reason
can be suggested for appropriating the name of the
old and long-established company."
It will be noted that the Court touched upon the interesting
possibility of the sale by the defendant company of its securities to a public which might well believe that they were purchasing these securities of the better-known plaintiff or at
least those of one of its subsidiaries. This, as we shall see, is
an element which other judges have mentioned. It is indicative of a tendency to consider general relations with the
public other than the mere sale of goods to it.
We have already suggested that it is the results rather
than the language of the Federal decisions which show a
tendency to differ from those of the New York Courts. A
multitude of citations from Federal decisions could be compiled to substantiate this suggestion, but it will, perhaps, be
sufficient to quote from the Supreme Court of the United
States in a recent decision, American Steel Foundries v.
Robertson, Commissioner,3 2 where the Court said, at page
380:
"The mere fact that one person has adopted and
used a trade mark on his goods does not prevent the
adoption and use of the same trade mark by others on
articles of a different description. There is no property in trade marks apart from the business of trade
in connection with which they are employed. * ** 'The
law of trade marks is but a part of the broader law of
unfair competition,' * * * the general purpose of which
12269 U. S. 372 (January, 1926).
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is to prevent one person from passing off his goods or
his business as the goods or business of another."
The Court then continues by discussing the relationship
between the law of trade marks and the law of trade names
saying that the same fundamental principles govern both,
and citing Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 33 all in the most classical language.
Another interesting liberal case is Wall v. Rolls-Royce of
America, Inc. 3 4 In this case Circuit Judge Buffington, writing for the Court, held that the defendant, Howard Wall,
doing business under the name "Rolls-Royce Tube Company," had been properly enjoined by the Court below from,
using the name "Rolls-Royce" in carrying on the business of
making and selling radio tubes. Aside from the use of the
name "Rolls-Royce," for which there was not the slightest
justification in fact, the only element of deceit in the case
was that Wall advertised his radio tubes by quotation marks
as "Rolls-Royce" tubes, and stated that such tubes were "like
their name, significant of quality." The plaintiff, a wellknown manufacturer of automobiles, never engaged in the
making of radio tubes. The Court, however, recognized that
the use by Wall of the plaintiff's name would injure the
plaintiff when used in connection with the manufacture of a
mechanical article of such a nature that the public might
have supposed the plaintiff was manufacturing it as a side
issue. The Court also stressed the possibility that Wall
might obtain credit and sell securities upon the strength of
the plaintiff's name, saying at page 334:
"In addition to what has been said, it is quite
possible that the use of such a name might lead third
parties to credit the plaintiff's business on account of
its name of 'Rolls-Royce,' with an unwarranted financial reliability, and if such assumptions eventually
proved unfounded the name of 'Rolls-Royce' would
.suffer accordingly."
194 N. Y. 429, 87 N. E. 674 (1909).
F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925). See also Duro Co. v. Duro Co., 27
F. (2d) 336, Dist. Ct. D. N. J., 1927); affirmed 27 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A., 3d,
1928).
34
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In this connection, Judge Buffington also wrote the following excellent sentence which sums up much of the intent
of the present article (p. 334) :
"And if this Rolls-Royce Radio Tube proved unsatisfactory, it would sow in his [the purchaser's]
mind at once an undermining and distrust of the excellence of product which the words, 'Rolls-Royce' had
hitherto stood for."
A similarly broad decision is Hudson Motor Car Co. v.
Hudson Tire Co.3 5 Here again the plaintiff was a wellknown manufacturer of automobiles. The defendant's business, while still non-competitive in the strict sense, was somewhat closer to the manufacture of automobiles than was the
defendant's businss in the Rolls-Royce case. It consisted of
the manufacture of "Hudson Cord," "New Hudson Cord,"
and "Hudson Super Cord" tires. It will be recalled that the
plaintiff has used the phrase "Super-Six" as a trade mark
which it has advertised extensively. The defendant first
adopted the word "Hudson" quite innocently in connection
with a garage which he operated under that name near the
Hudson Boulevard in Jersey City. le then gradually took
up the business of manufacturing tires out of the carcasses of
old tires which he worked together. Later the defendant took
up the manufacture of new tires and more and more adopted
marks and names similar to those used by the plaintiff in its
national advertising. The Court held the plaintiff entitled to
an injunction even though the defendants originally adopted
the name "Hudson" innocently. In doing so, it relied largely
upon a quite similar case in the Third Circuit from which
it made the following very pertinent and interesting quotations:
"That this is the case may be gathered from the
language of our own Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of Akron-Overland Tire Co. v. Willys-Overland
Co., 273 F. 674, at page 676, where the Court says, in
part:
'While it may be conceded that the plaintiff company manufactures automobiles and the defendant
S21 F. (2d) 453 (Dist. Ct. D. N. J., 1927).
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does not, and while the plaintiff does not make or sell
automobile tires, and the defendant retreads and sells
tires, and in exact terms the two do not compete in
these particular things, yet the fact remains that the
business of both is so connected with automobiles that
the public, in buying the stocks, securities, and retread
tires of the defendant company, by the use of the
word "Overland" in connection therewith, will, by such
descriptive word, be led to believe it is buying property or articles owned or dealt in by the plaintiff or
one of its subsidiary companies. That the plaintiffs
had in the word "Overland" a good will of high reputation and great value in connection with automobiles
cannot be gainsaid. That the defendants' use of the
word "Overland," in connection with the sale of its
retread tires and its stocks and securities, would enable it to share in the plaintiff's good will and reputation, also cannot be gainsaid. That such use of the
word "Overland" by the defendant would breed confusion and misunderstanding in the minds of the public is foreshadowed by what did happen in the way of
third parties confusing and connecting the defendant
and its acts with the plaintiff company, and even holding the plaintiff accountable for such acts. Indeed, it
is manifest that under the facts of this case the maintenance by the plaintiff of the good will attributed to
Overland business and products would, in the future,
be determined, not alone by what the plaintiff did to
uphold the standard of that good will, but by what the
defendant might do by failure to uphold such reputation and maintain such good will. * * * It will thus
be seen that the business of both companies, because
they both concerned some phase of automobile activity, were interrelated and that since the operations of
the plaintiff company in that field were known to, and
described by, the public by the business or trade-name
of "Overland," it necessarily followed that, when the
defendant company sought to also describe its
ventures by the trade-name "Overland," it was calculated to confuse the public mind and enabled the de-
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fendant to draw to itself, and to draw from the plaintiff, the exclusive trade name and trade good will
which the plaintiff, by a business course of years, had
given to the word "Overland" in connection with the
automobile industry. Such being the fact, it follows
that both the English and American authorities justify
the Court below in its action, for, in fact, there was
substantial and material competition between these
parties.'"
In Yale Electric Corporation v. Rlobertson, 6 the Court
held that complainant Yale Electric Corporation had been
properly refused its application to register the word "Yale"
for the products which it manufactured, namely flashlights,
drycells, and storage batteries, because of the fact that the
word "Yale" had been used for many years by the defendant
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. in connection with locks and keys.
The Court said at page 469: "The use of the word 'Yale' by
the plaintiff is purely arbitrary. It is not the name of anyone connected with the plaintiff's organization." It then
noted certain other evidence that the plaintiff was intentionally seeking to mislead the public, such as similarity in
the advertisements and particularly in the block print used
for the word "Yale." The Court distinguished American
Steel Foundries v. Rtobertson, supra, which had held that the
word "Simplex" could be registered as a trade mark on noncompeting goods in spite of the fact that it formed a part of
the corporate name of the defendant in that action. The distinction taken was in the following words:
"But the record shows as already noted, that the
goods of both plaintiff and defendant are sold in the
same stores, more particularly in hardware stores,
and presumably to the same class of purchasers. Of
course, the prospective purchaser of locks and keys
would not likely be led by the confusion of marks to
purchase flashlights or batteries but might be led to
purchase flashlights or batteries on the strength of
standing and reputation of the locks and keys bearing
the same trade mark. Thus confusion would result and
2021 F. (2d) 467 (Dist. Ct. D. Conn., 1927).
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not only the maker of the locks and keys but the public
as well would be deprived of the protection which it
was obviously the purpose of the trade mark statute to
give. And if it be found that there is doubt as to
whether such confusion will exist, it is the duty of the
court to resolve that doubt against the newcomer in
the field. Watke &, Co. v. Schafer d Go., 49 App. D.
C. 254, 263 F. 650." (Italics ours.)
The Court said further:
"The real question to be decided is: What does
the word 'Yale' signify to the hardware trade? Without doubt it identifies the Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. and
its products. Nor do I think it conclusive that the
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. does not make flashlights or
batteries, as this is a mere detail of evidence to be
taken with other evidence in the case."
The decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,37 with a most interesting and
instructive opinion written by Judge Learned Hand. It
reads, in part, as follows (p. 973):
"The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly
to this-as judges have repeated again and againthat one merchant shall not divert customers from
another by representing what he sells as emanating
from the second. This has been, and perhaps even
more now is, the whole Law and the Prophets on the
subject, though it assumes many guises. Therefore it
was at first a debatable point whether a merchant's
good will, indicated by his mark, could extend beyond
such goods as he sold. How could he lose bargains
which he had no means to fill? What harm did it do
a chewing gum maker to have an ironmonger use his
trade mark? The law often ignores the nicer sensibilities.
However, it has of recent years been recognized
that a merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own
Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972 (July, 1928).
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exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His
mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the
goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill.
If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation,
whose quality no longer lies within his own control.
This is an injury, even though the borrower does not
tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and
creator, and another can use it only as a mask. And
so it has come to be recognized that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to 'insure
against any identification of the two, it is unlawful.
[Citing four Federal cases.] Although it is quite true
that the point is still open in the Supreme Court.
Beech-Nut Co. v. Lorillard, 273 U. S. 629, 47 S. Ct.
481, 71 L. Ed. 810. * * * The defendant need not permit
another to attach to its good will the consequences of
trade methods not its own."
Here competition appears in its proper capacity. Instead of a sine qua non of relief Judge Hand would grant
relief "unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's
as to insure against any identification of the two." This, we
submit, puts the consideration of competition in its proper
place.
It is true that Federal Courts do not go so far as to
protect a trade name like "Simplex" where the record shows
that the term was a registered trade mark of about sixty
different companies.3 8 The net result of these Federal decisions is that competition in the strict sense is not a requisite
but that a newcomer is justified under many circumstances
in using a trade name which is geographical or descriptive
even though another or others have used it before him. An
interesting discussion of this view iin connection with technical trade marks is found in the article by Mr. Frank I.
Schechter in a recent volume of the Harvard Law Review,3 9
to which we have already referred.
' American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372 (1926).
'Frank 1. Schechter, "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection," 40
Harv. L. Rev. 813, at pages 826-830. See also, on the same point, France
Milling Co., Inc. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., Inc. 7 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 2d,
1925) ; certioraridenied 268 U. S.706 (1925).
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One other Federal case of a similar nature deserves
mention, Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co.40 In this case the
Hudson's Bay Co. was allowed to enjoin a retail dealer in
Dallas, Texas, from using the name "Hudson Bay Fur Company" even though the plaintiff sold no manufactured or raw
furs in the United States, although it was planning to commence business there by the use of a subsidiary New York
corporation. The plaintiff did, however, sell in London auction sales raw furs to manufacturers who in turn resold them
to retailers throughout this country, including Dallas, Texas.
There was a finding that actual confusion had resulted.
We close with a brief consideration of a rather unappetizing case, Standard Oil Co. v. California Peach & Fig
Growers, Inc. 4

1

This was a trade mark case in which the

Standard Oil Company, maker of "Nujol" medicinal mineral
oil, succeeded in enjoining the defendant from marketing
"NUJOL treated FIGS," which had been defended on the
grounds that there was no danger of confusion, and that
the defendant was within its rights because the figs in fact
were treated with "Nujol" bought on the open market. With
this second point we are not particularly concerned, but on
the first point District Judge Morris used language quite
similar to that used by Judge Hand in the Yale case, supra.
Thus he said, at page 285:
" * * * the proprietor of a trade mark is without

right to forbid or exclude the use of the same mark,
words, or symbol by another upon goods of a class and
quality so different from those of the origina(user as
to preclude the probability that purchasers will be
misled into believing that the different article springs
from a common source. * * * But goods are of the

same general class when either their general and essential characteristics are the same * * * or when, for

any other reason, they are so related or associated,
either in fact or in the mind of the public, that a
common trade mark would probably lead purchasers
to conclude that the several articles have a common
22 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A., 5th, 1927); certiorari denied 276 U. S. 628

(1928).

4128 F. (2d) 283 (Dist. Ct. D. Dela., October, 1928).

PROTECTION OF A TRADE NAME

origin, * * * Moreover, the owner of a trade mark
'truly arbitrary, strange, and fanciful' is entitled to a
monopoly of use for his mark in a wider field than is
he who employs a mark not of that character." (Italics ours.)
And on page 286:
"Defendant's use of plaintiff's trade mark stakes
the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of
defendant's goods. * * * The plaintiff is not required
to submit to this hazard."
We may conclude that the law governing the protection
of trade names is still in a formative stage, but that the present strong tendency, in the Federal Courts and in the New
York State Courts alike, is to depart from the classical
requirement of actual competition, in any strict sense, between the plaintiff and the defendant whom he seeks to enjoin from using a similar name. We may further conclude
that this tendency is more clearly marked in the decisions of
the Federal Courts than in those of the Courts of this State.
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